In 2023, a global marketing company—handling digital campaigns, data analytics, and creative delivery for Fortune 500 clients—suffered a devastating breach caused by something shockingly simple: a smishing attack.
Smishing (SMS phishing) might seem unsophisticated, but in this case, it led to the compromise of dozens of admin accounts, full access to sensitive marketing operations, and unauthorized access into client-facing systems.
What Happened?
It started with a fake SMS message sent to an employee who had administrator-level credentials for the agency’s shared infrastructure.
- The SMS looked like a routine internal notification, prompting a login.
- The employee entered their real credentials into a spoofed site.
- The attacker immediately logged in and pivoted laterally through the infrastructure.
Due to:
- Lack of MFA (Multi-Factor Authentication)
- No IP restrictions on admin access
- Flat network topology (no segmentation)
- Shared hosting and shared CMS logins across multiple client sites
…the attacker gained access to:
- Client campaign data
- Live websites
- Internal dashboards
- Credentials stored in plaintext or exported browser files
Within hours, the attacker had administrative visibility across the company’s marketing automation stack.
What They Should Have Done
This breach wasn’t caused by zero-days or exotic malware. It was a result of weak infrastructure governance and lack of preventative DevSecOps practices. Here’s what should’ve been in place:
| Failing | What They Should Have Done |
|---|---|
| No MFA on admin accounts | Enforce mandatory MFA across all systems, especially for infrastructure and CMS logins |
| Flat internal network | Use network segmentation and role-based access control (RBAC) to limit lateral movement |
| Shared infrastructure | Isolate each client environment using containers, subdomains, or staging/prod splits |
| No release process | CI/CD pipelines should be in place to control releases with audit logs, rollback ability, and pre-prod scanning |
| Weak backup system | Air-gapped and automated backups with point-in-time recovery would have limited damage and reduced downtime |
How We Would Have Helped
At Ijabat, we specialize in exactly this kind of high-risk infrastructure situation. Here’s how we would’ve stepped in—before the breach happened:
1. Infrastructure Hardening
- Move away from shared, flat environments to client-isolated containers or VPS setups.
- Enforce least-privilege access rules, MFA, and secure SSH/public key login only.
2. Automated Backups & Recovery
- Set up versioned, automated backups across databases, files, and critical systems.
- Perform simulated recovery drills to ensure business continuity.
3. CI/CD Pipeline Implementation
- Build secure, audit-ready deployment pipelines for websites, marketing apps, and internal tooling.
- Ensure no one pushes directly to production. Every deployment would go through approval, testing, and rollback safety.
4. Visibility & Monitoring
- Centralized logging of all infrastructure access, changes, and anomalies.
- Real-time alerts for login attempts, especially from unknown geographies or devices.
5. Staff Training & Phishing Defense
- Deploy realistic phishing tests quarterly.
- Train teams to detect social engineering across SMS, email, and other comms.
Don’t Be the Next Case Study
The attack on this marketing agency wasn’t advanced. It was preventable.
If you run a marketing firm—or manage infrastructure for one—and haven’t recently audited your security posture, now is the time. Waiting until “after something happens” often means you’ve already lost client data, credibility, and uptime.
Let’s talk. We’ll assess your current setup, highlight risks, and design a modern, secure infrastructure tailored to how you work.